A new article is now out in Spanish in Foro Internacional, which most consider Mexico’s top academic International Relations journal. My piece, “Coloso fragmentado: la agenda ‘interméstica’ y la política exterior latinoamericana,” is the first piece in the January issue. The English title would be roughly “A fragmented colossus: The ‘intermestic’ agenda and Latin American foreign policy.” The official text is in Spanish, but I have included links to both Spanish and English versions and abstracts below.
La versión del artículo en español se encuentra aquí.
An unofficial, pre-translation English-language version is available here.
Abstracts below the jump.
Resumen
Los asuntos “intermésticos” como el comercio, la migración y el narcotráfico tienen un gran peso en las relaciones contemporáneas entre Estados Unidos y América Latina. Este artículo sostiene que los asuntos intermésticos enfrentan más actores con capacidad de veto y tienen menos “conjuntos ganadores” (win-sets) que los asuntos de política exterior tradicionales, lo que dificulta aún más los intentos por influir en las políticas estadounidenses.
Esta tesis se examina tomando como ejemplo el caso de la disputa entre Estados Unidos y México por el cruce fronterizo de camiones y los veinte años que el gobierno mexicano tuvo que luchar contra funcionarios y grupos de interés estadounidenses para lograr que aquel país cumpliera con lo dispuesto en el tlcan. Luego de examinar brevemente otros asuntos similares, el artículo concluye que los asuntos intermésticos exigen estrategias diplomáticas diferentes por parte de los legisladores latinoamericanos.
Abstract
“Intermestic” issues, including trade, migration, and drug-trafficking, dominate contemporary U.S.-Latin American relations and matter deeply to Latin American and Caribbean states. Despite their importance to Latin American leaders and publics, Latin American diplomats have had less success influencing U.S. policy than in other spheres. These failures owe, at least in part, to the dynamics that intermestic issues create in the U.S. foreign policy process. While those dynamics have been broadly explored, there has been less attention to the ways in which these dynamics affect Latin American and Caribbean foreign policy towards the United States. Building on work by Putnam, Milner, Tsebelis, and others, this article argues that intermestic issues have more veto players and narrower win-sets than traditional foreign policy issues, which complicates attempts at influencing U.S. policies. The argument is examined against the case of the U.S.-Mexico cross-border trucking dispute, where the Mexican government struggled with U.S. officials and interest groups for two decades to gain U.S. compliance with NAFTA. After briefly exploring other relevant issues, the article suggests that for Latin American policymakers, intermestic issues demand different diplomatic strategies.
Tom Long, PhD 